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Quantum secure communication scheme with W state
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Recently, Cao et al. proposed a new quantum secure direct communication scheme using W
state. In their scheme, the error rate introduced by an eavesdropper who takes intercept-resend
attack, is only 8.3%. Actually, their scheme is just a quantum key distribution scheme because the
communication parties first create a shared key and then encrypt the secret message using one-time
pad. We then present a quantum secure communication scheme using three-qubit W state. In
our scheme, the error rate is raised to 25% and it is not necessary for the present scheme to use
alternative measurement or Bell basis measurement. We also show our scheme is unconditionally
secure.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum key distribution (QKD) utilizes quantum ef-
fects to distribute a secret key among legitimate parties
[1, 2, 3]. Different to QKD, Quantum secure direct com-
munication (QSDC) is to transmit the secret message
directly without first establishing a key to encrypt them
[4, 5, 6]. QSDC can be used in some special environ-
ments which has been shown by Bostro¨em and Deng
et al.[7, 8]. Many researches have been carried out in
QSDC [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
These works can be divided into two kinds, one utilizes
single photons, the other utilizes entangled state. Deng
et al. proposed a QSDC scheme using batches of sin-
gle photons which serves as one-time pad [9]. Cai et
al. presented a deterministic secure direct communica-
tion scheme using single qubit in a mixed state [10].
We proposed a QSDC scheme and a multiparty con-
trolled QSDC scheme using order rearrange of single
photons [11]. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs and
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states are the main
quantum channels exploited in the QSDC. Deng et al.
put forward a two-step QSDC protocol using Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs [8]. We presented a QSDC
scheme using EPR pairs and teleportation [12] and a
multiparty controlled QSDC scheme using Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states [13]. Wang et al. proposed
a QSDC scheme with quantum superdense coding [14]
and a multi-step QSDC scheme using GHZ state [15].
Gao et al. and Zhang et al. each presented a QSDC
scheme using entanglement swapping [16, 17].
Entanglement is at the heart of quantum information
processes. The entanglement of three-qubit is classified
by separable, bi-separable, W, and GHZ state [18, 19, 20].
W state has the different physical properties from GHZ
state [21, 22]. An important characteristic of three-
particle GHZ state is that loss of any one of the qubits
leaves the other two in a mixed state with only classical
correlations. W state is the 3-qubit state in which each
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pair of qubits have the same and maximum amount of
bipartite entanglement. This feature makes the entan-
glement of the W state maximally symmetrically robust
against loss of any single qubit. The GHZ class state
cannot be transformed to the W class state under any
local operation and classical communication (LOCC).
In a recent Letter, Cao et al. proposed a novel QSDC
scheme based on a series of four-qubit W states and local
Bell basis measurement (hereafter called Cao’s scheme)
[23]. However, Cao’s scheme is not a genuine QSDC
scheme. And if an eavesdropper, say Eve performs
intercept-resend attack on their scheme, the error rate
introduced by her is only 8.3%. Then if the communica-
tion parties did not detect the existence of Eve, all the
secret messages will be stolen by Eve. To improve the
ability of eavesdropping check, we present a quantum se-
cure communication scheme using three-qubit W states.
In the present scheme, the error rate introduced by Eve
can achieve 25%. At the same time, the efficiency of
the scheme is also improved because the communication
parties need only to perform deterministic von Neumann
measurement. Different to QKD, in our scheme, the com-
munication parties cannot establish a shared key without
the sender’s measurement results. Only after obtaining
the sender’s classical message could the receiver recover
the sender’s secret message, which is different to QSDC
in some sort. Therefore we call the present scheme quan-
tum secure communication scheme. The security for the
scheme is the same as that for BBM92 protocol [3], which
is unconditional secure.
We first consider the intercept-resend attack in Cao’s
scheme. The four-qubit symmetric W state can be writ-
2ten in different bases as
|W4〉 = 1
2
(|1000〉+ |0100〉+ |0010〉+ |0001〉)1234
=
1
2
[(|10〉+ |01〉)|00〉+ |00〉(|10〉+ |01〉)]
=
1
2
[|ψ+〉(|φ+〉+ |φ−〉) + (|φ+〉+ |φ−〉)|ψ+〉]
=
1
4
[|++〉(2|++〉+ |+−〉+ | −+〉)
−| − −〉(2| − −〉+ |+−〉+ | −+〉)
+|+−〉(|++〉 − | − −〉)
+| −+〉(|++〉 − | − −〉)], (1)
where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). Ac-
cording to Cao’s scheme, Alice sends the B sequence to
Bob. Suppose Eve intercepts the B sequence and per-
forms Z-basis (|0〉, |1〉) measurement on the two parti-
cles Pi(3, 4) in the B sequence (In this attack, Eve can
also use Bell basis measurement). If Eve’s measurement
result is |00〉 (|10〉 or |01〉), she resends the particles 3, 4
in the state |00〉 (|ψ+〉) to Bob. In Cao’s scheme, Alice
will choose randomly Z-basis, X-basis (|+〉, |−〉) or Bell
basis measurement to check eavesdropping. Because of
Eve’s attack, the W state collapses to
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|10〉+ |01〉)12|00〉34
=
1√
2
|ψ+〉)12(|φ+〉+ |φ−〉)34
=
1√
2
(|++〉 − | − −〉)12(|++〉
+|+−〉+ | −+〉+ | − −〉)34 (2)
or
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
|00〉
12
(|10〉+ |01〉)34
=
1√
2
(|φ+〉+ |φ−〉)12|ψ+〉)34
=
1√
2
(|++〉+ |+−〉+ | −+〉+ | − −〉)12
(|++〉 − | − −〉)34 (3)
each with probability 1/2. Obviously, Eve’s attack will
not introduce any error if Alice and Bob perform Z-basis
or Bell basis measurement. If the two parties perform
X-basis measurement, the error rate introduced by Eve
will be 1/4 according to the Eqs. 1, 2 and 3. Thus
the total error rate is 1/3 × 1/4 = 0.083. And if Alice
utilizes this insecure quantum channel to transmit her
secret message, according to the process of Cao’s scheme,
Eve will obtain all of Alice’s secret messages because Eve
can make certain whether Alice’s or Bob’s measurement
result is |ψ+〉 or |φ±〉 in this attack.
Suppose Alice encodes |ψ+〉→ 0, |φ±〉→ 1 and Bob en-
codes |φ±〉→ 0, |ψ+〉→ 1. According to Cao’s scheme, af-
ter the eavesdropping check, Alice and Bob perform Bell
basis measurements on their corresponding particles and
they then establish a shared key. The classical messages
that Alice sends to Bob are actually the data which Alice
generated by using their shared key to encrypt her secret
messages. In other words, Alice’s outcome encoding ⊕
her secret message equals to classical information, where
⊕ indicates modulo 2 addition. Bob can then recover the
secret message by using his outcome encoding ⊕ classical
information, which is the same as one-time pad.
We then present a quantum secure communication
scheme using three-qubit W state in order to improve
the checking probability and the efficiency for the scheme
with W state. The details of our scheme is as follows:
(S1) Alice prepares N three-qubit W states each of
which is randomly in one of the two states
|Φ1〉 = 1√
3
(|100〉+ |010〉+ |001〉)123, (4)
|Φ2〉 = 1√
3
(|10+〉+ |01+〉+ |00−〉)123, (5)
where 1, 2 and 3 represent the three particles of W state.
We denotes the ordered N three-qubit W states with
[P1(1, 2, 3),P2(1, 2, 3),· · · , PN (1, 2, 3)] (hereafter called
W sequence), where the subscript indicates the order
of each three-particle in the sequence. Alice takes the
particles 1 and 2 from each state to form an ordered par-
ticle sequence [P1(1, 2), P2(1, 2),· · · , PN (1, 2)], called A
sequence. The remaining partner particles compose B
sequence, [P1(3), P2(3),· · · , PN (3)]. Alice selects ran-
domly a sufficiently large subset from the W sequence
for eavesdropping check, called checking sequence (C se-
quence). The remaining particles in theW sequence form
a message sequence (M sequence).
(S2) Alice encodes her secret message on the M se-
quence by performing one of the two unitary operations
I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
U = iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|. (6)
on each of the particles 3 in the M sequence. If her
secret message is “0” (“1”), Alice performs operation I
(U). The operation U flips the state in both Z-basis and
X-basis, as
U |0〉 = −|1〉, U |1〉 = |0〉,
U |+〉 = |−〉, U |−〉 = −|+〉. (7)
Alice then sends the B sequence to Bob.
(S3) After confirming Bob has received the B sequence,
Alice announces publicly the initial states she prepared.
If the initial state is |Φ1〉, Bob has nothing to do. If the
initial state is |Φ2〉, he performs Hadamada operation on
the particle 3 in the B sequence.
(S4) Alice publishes the position of the C sequence.
Both Alice and Bob measure the sampling particles in
the Z-basis. Alice let Bob announce his measurement
results. If Alice’s result is |10〉 or |01〉 (|00〉), Bob’s result
must be |0〉 (|1〉). She can then evaluate the error rate
3of the transmission of the B sequence. If the error rate
exceeds the threshold, they abort the scheme. Otherwise,
they continue to the next step.
(S5) Alice and Bob perform Z-basis measurements on
their corresponding particles in the M sequence. Alice
then publishes her measurement results of the particles
2, 3 in the M sequence. Thus Bob can recover Alice’s se-
cret message, according to Alice’s result, as illustrated in
Table 1. Suppose Bob’s result is |0〉. If Alice’s measure-
TABLE I: The recovery of Alice’s secret message
Alice’s result Bob’s result secret message
|10〉 or |01〉 |0〉 0
|10〉 or |01〉 |1〉 1
|00〉 |0〉 1
|00〉 |1〉 0
ment result of particle 2, 3 in theM sequence is |00〉 (|10〉
or |01〉), they then conclude that Alice’s secret message
is “1” (“0”).
We now discuss the security for the present scheme.
We first consider the intercept-resend attack strategy. In
this attack, Eve intercepts the particles in the B sequence
and makes measurements on them. Then she resends
a particle sequence to Bob according to her measure-
ment results. In other words, the state of each par-
ticle in the resend sequence is equal to her measure-
ment result. Suppose Eve measures the intercepted par-
ticle in Z-basis. If the initial state is |Φ2〉, it collapses
to 1√
3
(|10〉+|01〉+|00〉)|0〉 or 1√
3
(|10〉+|01〉-|00〉)|1〉 each
with probability 1/2. Thus the error rate introduced by
Eve will be 1/2 × 1/3 + 1/2 × 2/3 = 1/2. If the ini-
tial state is |Φ1〉, Eve’s attack will not be detected. In
this instance, the total error rate is 25%. Suppose Eve
measures the intercepted particle in the X-basis. Sim-
ilarly, if the initial state is |Φ1〉, the state will collapse
to 1√
3
(|10〉+|01〉+|00〉)|+〉 or 1√
3
(|10〉+|01〉-|00〉)|−〉 each
with probability 1/2. According to the scheme, Bob will
perform Hadamada operation on the particle 3. Thus the
error rate will also be 1/4. Therefore, in the intercept-
resend attack, the total error rate introduced by Eve
achieves 25%.
We then consider the collective attack strategy. In this
strategy, Eve intercepts the particle Pi(3) (i=1,2,· · · ,N)
and uses it and her own ancillary particle in the state
|0〉 to do a CNOT operation (the particle Pi(3) is the
controller, Eve’s ancillary particle is the target). Then
Eve resends the particle Pi(3) to Bob. However, Eve
cannot make certain the initial state which the particle
3 belongs to. Suppose the initial state is |Φ1〉, Eve will
attack successfully. But if the initial state is |Φ2〉, the
state is changed to
|Φ′2〉 =
1√
6
[(|10〉+ |01〉)(|00〉+ |11〉)
+|00〉(|00〉 − |11〉)]123e, (8)
where the subscript e indicates Eve’s ancillary parti-
cle. According to the scheme, |Φ′2〉 will collapse to
1√
3
(|10〉+|01〉+|00〉)|00〉 or 1√
3
(|10〉+|01〉-|00〉)|11〉 each
with probability 1/2. Similar to the analysis in the
intercept-resend attack, in this attack, the total error rate
introduced by Eve is also 25%.
In fact, the security for the present scheme is based
on entanglement and random Hadamada operation. In
the scheme, the random Hadamada operation is equal
to selecting Z-basis or X-basis randomly to measure the
transmitting particle. Note that
|Φ1〉 = 1√
3
[(|10〉+ |01〉)|0〉+ |00〉|1〉)]123, (9)
|Φ1〉 = 1√
3
[(|10〉+ |01〉)|+〉+ |00〉|−〉)]123. (10)
In this way, the security for the scheme is the same as
that for BBM92 protocol which is proved to be uncon-
ditionally secure. As we described above, our scheme is
also unconditionally secure.
So far we have presented a quantum secure communi-
cation scheme using W state. The security for the scheme
is equal to that for BBM92 protocol. Cao’s scheme is
not a genuine QSDC scheme because the communication
parties first establish a shared key and then encrypt the
sender’s secret to the receiver. Strictly speaking, our
scheme is also not a QSDC scheme because only the
sender’s measurement result has been published could
the receiver recover the sender’s secret. Certainly, our
scheme is not a QKD scheme because the communication
parties can not establish a shared key if the sender’s mea-
surement result is not published. Therefore we call the
present scheme quantum secure communication scheme.
In our scheme, all of the W states are used to transmit the
sender’s secret message except those chosen for checking
eavesdropping. The communication parties need only de-
terministic von Neumann measurement. In this way, the
present scheme is practical within today’s technology.
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